INTRODUCTION
Maintaining cash is closely associated with firms' normal transaction and business operations, and if the level of cash holdings is too low, it would affect the long-term solvency of companies. A far serious problem is that these corporate resources may be occupied and used by managers and large shareholders for personal benefits at the expense of the wealth of firm and the rights of minority shareholders may be expropriated. In this study, we attempt to explore how managerial ownership and other corporate governance characteristics affect the level of corporate cash holdings in China.
The earlier work of Keynes (1936) explains three motives of cash holdings, which are the transaction motive, the precautionary motive and the speculative motive. Researchers apply many financial theories to explain corporate cash holdings levels, contributing to the emergence of the trade-off theory, the financial hierarchy theory and the free cash flow theory. The basic idea of the trade-off theory is the presence of optimal level of cash holdings. This optimal level could be achieved if the marginal benefits of cash holdings exceed the marginal costs of cash holdings (Myers, 1977; Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004) . The financial hierarchy theory, which is also called the pecking order theory, assumes that there is no optimal level of cash holdings. This theory presents a hierarchy of different sources of financing (Myers & Majluf, 1984) . Regarding corporate cash holdings, it is This study explores the determinants of corporate cash holdings in the Chinese context. As one of the largest developing countries in the world, China offers an interesting opportunity to explore the role of corporate governance, and ownership structure in explaining corporate cash holdings. Owing to the unique economic problems in the developing and emerging economies, this study aims to investigate whether the research findings on developed countries could be generalized globally. Applying fixed-effects estimations on a sample of 115 Chinese firms listed between 2012 and 2016, we find that the level of corporate cash holdings has a significantly negative relationship with leverage, bank debt, noncash liquid assets and managerial ownership. In particular, cash flow volatility, investment opportunity and dividend have a significantly positive relationship with cash holdings levels. These findings are consistent with the majority of the existing studies carried out in the Western context. We also find that firm size, cash flow, board independence and ownership concentration have a significant influence on the level of corporate cash holdings. Our study contributes to the finance literature and we offer new insights into the relationship between corporate governance and corporate cash holdings in the Chinese context. Some of the findings on the developed countries could be generalized to a wider context. Further, the unique relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings in the Chinese context provides empirical insights for further research.
Keywords: Cash Holdings, Chinese Listed Firms, Trade-Off Theory, Pecking Order Theory, Free Cash Flow Theory served as a buffer between retained earnings and investment needs (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004) . The free cash flow theory suggests that managers have a tendency to hold large cash reserves for their own discretionary powers (Jensen, 1986 Guney et al. (2007) examine the cash holding activities in a number of developed nations including France, Japan, UK, the USA and Germany. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) use a sample of UK firms to examine the factors affecting corporate cash holding in the UK. Overall, it is worth noting that most of the studies put the focus on the cash holdings levels in the developed countries. While the developed countries generally own favourable market environment and mature capital markets, the unique economic problems are presented in the developing and emerging economies. Thus, the research findings on developed countries may not be generalized to a wider world. As the largest developing country in the world, Chinese context offers an interesting opportunity to explore the role of corporate governance, and ownership structure in explaining corporate cash holdings. Particularly, in the recent years, Chinese corporate cash holding levels has mounted to an abnormal level. Thus, through using the sample period from 2012 to 2016, we provide recent empirical insights about the determinants of corporate cash holdings in the Chinese context.
Regarding the purpose of this paper, we aim to investigate which factors have a significant impact on the corporate cash holdings levels in the context of Chinese listed firms, during the reporting period of 2012 and 2016. We further explore how firmspecific factors may affect the cash holdings levels in Chinese listed companies.
The major contribution of this paper is that it provides fresh empirical insights to the ambiguous predictions based on different theories, and to further explore the inconclusive results reported in the existing studies. Our findings show that the high level of cash holdings is related to firms having a low level of leverage, high variability in cash flows, low bank debts, more investment opportunities, higher dividend payouts, low non-cash liquid assets, and low level of managerial ownership.
The outline of the remaining paper consists of four sections. Section 2 provides a critique of existing literature, section 3 described the research methodology of the paper, and subsequently, section 4 discusses the results, and, finally, section 5 presents the conclusion. 
LITERATURE REVIEW

Leverage
From a trade-off perspective, highly leveraged firms face a higher probability of bankruptcy and risks of financial distress, and highly levered firms are expected to have a higher level of cash holdings (Ferreira & the pecking order theory expects a negative relationship, owing to the reason that cash and debt follow an inverse pattern, in particular, when the level of an investment exceeds retained earnings (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004) . Agency theory also predicts that leverage is negatively associated with cash holdings. This is because of the monitoring role of debt financing, which restricts high-leveraged firms to have a lower level of managerial discretion (Opler et al., 1999; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004 
Corporate cash flows
There are two major views about the expected relation between cash flows and cash holdings. Under the trade-off theory, cash flows are considered as cash substitutes (Kim et al., 1998; Ferreira & Vilela, 2004) . In contrast, the pecking order theory suggests that cash flows are regarded as a source of internal funds, and could be better than costly external funds, which, thereby implies that cash flows are positively correlated with cash holdings ( by calculating the standard deviation of cash flows to total assets over the 5-year sample period. We propose the following hypothesis:
Cash flow volatility
There is a positive relationship between cash flow volatility and cash holdings.
Bank debt
Bank financing can reduce informational asymmetries and agency conflicts. Therefore, banks could effectively perform the monitoring function of debt, resulting from the reduction in financing costs (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004 ). Bank financing is often considered as a corporate governance mechanism, and borrowers are often required to strictly meet the covenants' requirements. Bank debt could also be treated as a substitution for cash, which may explain the expected negative relationship between bank debt and cash holdings. Owing to the different field contents in the database and the requirement to distinguish with the leverage, we consider the ratio of bank debt to total liability as a more appropriate representation of bank debt. We, therefore, derive the following hypothesis.
H 5 : There is a negative relationship between bank debt and cash holdings.
Dividends
Companies that pay dividends are expected to hold less cash for the reason that they could obtain money by reducing their dividends (Opler et (2004), we use the market value of total assets (book value of total assets minus book value of shareholders' equity plus market value of equity) divided by book value of total assets (MARTOBOOK). We derive the following hypothesis:
There is a positive relationship between investment opportunity and cash holdings.
Non-cash liquid assets
Theoretically, a negative relationship is predicted between non-cash liquid assets and cash holdings. This is because non-cash liquid assets are considered a substitution for cash when firms are facing liquidity problems (Opler et 
Managerial ownership
According to Jensen (1986) , agency problems could be largely reduced by increasing the level of managerial ownership. The rationale lies in the interest-alignment effect with increased managerial ownership. Specifically, managers are expected to apply resources to maximize value which is aligned with shareholders' interests (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004) . The reduction in the agency conflicts contributes to the lower agency costs and less costly external financing, resulting in the lower level of cash holdings (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004; Chen, 2008 
Board independence
Ownership concentration
The definitions of all variables are reported in Appendix 1.
Following the popularity of OLS in prior research, we started our initial analyses with Pooled OLS estimation. The results reported under OLS need to be interpreted with cautions, as OLS fails to control for endogeneity problems (Ullah et al., 2018) . Fixed effects panel data estimation could correct for some of the endogeneity issues because the internal transformation process used in fixed effects could remove unobserved heterogeneity (Ullah et al., 2018) .
Cash ratio is applied as a proxy to measure corporate cash holdings. Previous literature uses two major definitions of cash ratio. Prior research also uses a ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets (Kim et Ferreira and Vilela (2004) . Owing to the fact that there would not be a significant difference in the results by using these two ratios, we used the cash ratio, measured by cash and cash equivalents to total assets. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for all the variables. In order to deal with extreme outliers, we winsorize all of the variables at 1% level. Table 1 shows that Chinese listed firms hold around 18% of their total assets in cash and cash equivalents. However, a higher standard deviation of 13% could demonstrate considerable differences in the cash holdings levels among Chinese listed firms. The average for banking financing is 27% which reflects the influence of Chinese banks in the financing activities of Chinese listed firms. Board independence is around 40%, while the percentage of ownership concentration is 51% which shows the degree of ownership concentration in Chinese listed companies. We employ a pooled OLS model in our initial analysis with the year and industry dummies included in the model. Furthermore, for all of the regression models, the present study tests the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation attempting to avoid the biased estimates. We find an insignificantly positive association between cash flow (CFLOW) and cash holdings level in the fixed effects estimation. The insignificant positive relation could not provide evidence for the pecking-order argument, which considers cash flow as an important source of internal funds. However, the negative sign in OLS estimation supports the trade-off view, where cash flow is regarded as a cash substitute. The mixed results in the two models could not be used to make inferences about the relationship between cash flow and cash holdings levels. In terms of cash flow volatility, the coefficients show the positive relationship (at 1% significance level) for the pooled OLS model and the fixed effects model. The findings show that Chinese companies have a tendency to hold a large amount of cash when facing high probability/risk of cash shortage. The result is in line with the earlier research of Opler et al. (1999) and Han and Qiu (2007) . The results also show strong evidence that bank debt (BANK_DEBT) has negative impacts on cash holdings, which is consistent with our expected hypothesis. The reason lies in the monitoring role of bank debt, which reduces the financing costs and as a result bank financing offers a favourable source of financing compared to internally generated cash. This negative finding is in line with the prior empirical work of Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) and Ferreira and Vilela (2004) .
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
We also find that non-cash liquid assets (LIQUID) have a negative impact on cash holdings in Chinese listed firms. Liquid assets are considered as a valid substitution for cash. This negative relationship is also reported in prior empirical work of Ferreira and Vilela (2004) and Chen (2008) . We also report that investment opportunity (MARTOBOOK) shows a positive relationship with cash holdings level in both pooled OLS and the fixed effects models. This indicates that Chinese firms anticipating investments opportunities in near future are more likely to increase their cash reserves to meet their investment requirements. Previous studies are also supportive of these arguments (Bates et al., 2009; Hardin et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2011) . We also find a positive relationship between dividend payment and corporate cash holdings levels. This implies that dividend-paying firms are likely to keep higher cash reserves (Chen et al., 2012; Hill et al., 2014) . This finding contradicts the view that dividend-paying firms would cut the dividend to obtain funds (Ferreira & Vilela, 2004) .
We find that managerial ownership (MANAGER) is negatively associated with cash holdings. This is in line with the interest-alignment effect of managerial ownership, which shows that a conflict of interests between principal and agent could be aligned through managerial shareholdings. For board independence (BOARD_INDEP), the coefficients indicate a negative relationship, which highlights the monitoring role of independent boards in minimizing agency costs and information asymmetry costs in Chinese listed companies. Finally, our fixed effects estimation shows that ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP) is significantly positively related to corporate cash holdings levels in Chinese listed companies. This result supports the monitoring function of large shareholders in companies where ownership is highly concentrated. This is also consistent with the view that large blockholders play a distinctive monitoring role within the Chinese corporate governance landscape.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate the impact of the firmspecific determinants on the level of corporate cash holdings for a sample of 115 large Chinese listed firms for the period 2012 to 2016. We report a number of key determinants of corporate cash holdings. The results show that cash holdings levels are negatively related to leverage, bank debt, and non-cash liquid assets. We also find that corporate cash holdings levels in Chinese listed firms are significantly positively associated with cash flow volatility, investment opportunity and dividends. For the remaining variables including firm size, cash flow, board independence and ownership concentration, the mixed results under OLS and fixed effects estimation could not ascertain their exact relationship with cash holdings levels. This paper focusses on the firm-specific determinants which are firm financial characteristics and corporate governance factors. China has a relatively well-developed capital market and many Chinese companies are going abroad (listed in the overseas markets), which provides them with an opportunity to learn and implement best corporate governance practices acquired in the international markets. Other factors such as legal environment and national culture also have potential effects on the cash holdings levels. However, the present study did not examine such national-level characteristics. Lastly, we also employed static panel data estimation without considering potential dynamic endogeneity issues. This paper only focuses on firm-specific factors in understanding the determinants of corporate cash holdings. Further research could examine this phenomenon in an international context by exploring how country-specific variables, including national culture, political stability, judicial efficiency and legal environment may impact corporate cash holdings levels.
